





Wage formation under low inflation
by
Steinar HoldenISSN 0801-2504 (printed) 1502-8143 (online)
ISBN 82-7553-264-7 (printed), 82-7553-265-5 (online)
Working papers from Norges Bank can be ordered by e-mail:
posten@norges-bank.no
or from Norges Bank, Subscription service,
P.O.Box. 1179 Sentrum 
N-0107Oslo, Norway.
Tel. +47 22 31 63 83, Fax. +47 22 41 31 05
Working papers from 1999 onwards are available as pdf-files on the bank’s
web site: www.norges-bank.no, under “Publications”.
Norges Bank’s working papers present
research projects and reports
(not usually in their final form)
and are intended inter alia to enable
the author to benefit from the comments
of colleagues and other interested parties.
Views and conclusions expressed in working papers are 
the responsibility of the authors alone.
Working papers fra Norges Bank kan bestilles over e-post:
posten@norges-bank.no




Telefon 22 31 63 83, Telefaks 22 41 31 05
Fra 1999 og senere er publikasjonene tilgjengelige som pdf-filer 
på www.norges-bank.no, under “Publikasjoner”.
Working papers inneholder forskningsarbeider 
og utredninger som vanligvis
ikke har fått sin endelige form. 
Hensikten er blant annet at forfatteren 
kan motta kommentarer fra kolleger 
og andre interesserte.
Synspunkter og konklusjoner i arbeidene 
står for forfatternes regning.Wage formation under low inflation* 
Steinar Holden* 
University of Oslo and Norges Bank 
Department of Economics 
University of Oslo 




This paper reviews the literature on the effects of low steady-state inflation on wage forma-
tion, focusing on four different effects. First, under low inflation, downward nominal wage ri-
gidity (DNWR) may prevent real wage cuts that would have happened had inflation been 
higher. Second, wages (and prices) are given in nominal contracts, and inflation affects both 
how often wages are adjusted, and to what extent wages are set in a forward-looking manner. 
Third, incomplete labour contracts may provide workers with scope for inflicting costs on the 
firm without violating the contract, thus forcing the firm to accept a rise in nominal wages. 
Fourth, if effort depends on wages relative to a reference level, and workers and firms under-
weight inflation when updating the reference level, positive but moderate inflation may re-
duce wage pressure. The paper ends by a brief survey of empirical evidence, and a discussion 
of whether labour markets may adapt to a low inflation environment. 
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1  Introduction 
Economists and practitioners now agree that monetary policy should aim at low inflation. Yet 
a number of economists and observers have argued that if monetary policy aims at inflation 
that is too low, this may involve considerable costs for society (Tobin, 1972, Holden, 1994, 
Akerlof, Dickens and Perry, 1996, 2000, the Economist, 2003). A key concern is that under 
low or zero inflation, downward rigidity of nominal wages may induce higher wage pressure, 
involving higher equilibrium unemployment. Other economists have countered this view, argu-
ing that any downward nominal wage rigidity that may exist is the result of an inflationary 
environment, and that society will adapt to a zero inflation policy without large and persistent 
effects on output and unemployment (Ball and Mankiw, 1994, Gordon, 1996). 
In this paper I shall review what the economic literature has to say on the effects of low 
steady-state inflation on wage formation.
1 Crudely, one can distinguish four arguments for 
why inflation may affect wage setting. First, under low inflation, downward nominal wage rigi-
dity  (DNWR) may prevent real wage cuts that would have happened had inflation been 
higher. Second, wages (and prices) are given in nominal contracts, and inflation affects both 
how often wages are adjusted, and to what extent wages are set in a forward-looking manner. 
Third, incomplete labour contracts may provide workers with scope for inflicting costs on the 
firm without violating the contract, thus forcing the firm to accept a rise in nominal wages. 
Unless there is sufficient inflation to provide “room” for this “minimum” wage growth, wage 
pressure will rise, thus increasing unemployment. Fourth, if effort depends on wages relative 
to a reference level, and workers and firms underweight inflation when updating the reference 
level, positive but moderate inflation may reduce wage pressure.  
Among many economists, these mechanisms will be met with considerable scepticism, based 
on the argument that rational agents care only about real variables, so that any effect of nominal 
variables must be due to money illusion that will disappear over time. However, as will become 
apparent below, many of the mechanisms are developed in models with rational agents, who 
only care about real variables. Thus, they are not subject to this critique. Other effects do hinge 
on money illusion, but these effects are accompanied by considerable supporting evidence. 
A basic underlying assumption throughout the literature that I review is that there is some 
sort of nominal rigidity in wages. This assumption can be justified in various ways. First, it is 
a fact of life that, in most industrialised economies, most workers have their wage set in some 
type of contract, either a collective agreement or an individual labour contract. Payment is 
typically specified in nominal terms, although annual, partial indexation to the consumer price 
index is sometimes used, in particular in periods of high inflation. Such contracts are not ad-3
justed continuously; see survey in Taylor (1999), and Calmfors et al. (2001) for documenting 
the extensive coverage of collective agreements in most Western European countries.  
There may be several reasons for the prevalence of rigid wage contracts. One aspect is that 
contracts may prove useful so as to prevent continuous haggling over the wage level. Con-
tracts might also be useful to share risk or to protect against opportunistic behaviour. Nominal 
contracts might be practical, as continuous or frequent adjustment to some price index might 
involve additional cumbersome calculations and updating. Indexation may also entail a risk 
(as perceived of the wage setters) that the index exhibits surprising and unwarranted changes. 
Gottfries (1992) provides a possible justification for why wage contracts are set in nominal 
terms, as seen from the point of view of the firm and the insiders (the current workforce).  
Note that what matters for the issues discussed here is not the rate of inflation per se, but to 
what extent there is room for nominal wage growth. Clearly, if there is high productivity 
growth, or low growth in import prices, there will be more room for nominal wage growth 
even at low cpi inflation. This distinction is important in empirical work and in policy discus-
sion, but will be neglected in the following. 
The paper does not aim to explore what the optimal rate of inflation is. As is well known, 
inflation involves a number of costs and benefits that are not directly related to wage setting 
(interaction with tax systems, effects on money holdings, seignorage, uncertainty and the ef-
fects of zero bound to nominal interest rates, etc.). These costs and benefits are neglected in 
the present paper. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, I discuss the effects of 
downward nominal wage rigidity. The effect of inflation on staggered nominal wage contracts 
is surveyed in section 3. Section 4 covers the effect of incomplete labour contracts and section 
5 deals with multi-level bargaining. In section 6, I discuss near-rational wage setters. Some of 
the empirical evidence is surveyed in section 7. Section 8 discusses to what extent society 
might adapt to a low inflation environment. Section 9 concludes. 
2  The effect of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) 
The seminal contribution on DNWR is Tobin (1972). Tobin argued that low (zero) inflation 
involves higher unemployment because nominal wages are rigid downwards. Sector-specific 
demand shocks imply that demand varies between different parts of the economy. In the parts 
of economy where there is excess demand, wages increase, while in parts of the economy 
with excess supply, DNWR implies that wages do not go down (or they go down less). Thus, 
1 Clearly, an unanticipated reduction in inflation induces higher real wages, and thus also affects output. Such 
temporary effects are neglected here.4
widespread excess supply – lower aggregate employment – is necessary to keep inflation very 
low.
Several different justifications for DNWR have been suggested in the literature:2
x co-ordination failure and the concern for relative wages. 
x fairness; nominal wage cuts are viewed as unfair 
x legal restrictions: wages are given in contracts that can only be changed by mutual consent  
Co-ordination failure was a key argument of Keynes (1936). He argued that workers are 
concerned about relative wages, and thus oppose nominal wage cuts as this leads to lower 
relative wages. Workers are less opposed to the same reduction in real wages if it takes place 
via higher prices, as this does not affect relative wages. Bhaskar (1990) provides additional 
microfoundations for this idea, based on the assumption that workers’ disutility of being paid 
less than others is greater than the utility gain of being paid more. 
The fairness argument – that employers avoid cutting nominal wages because employees 
and employers think that nominal wage cuts are unfair – is the common hypothesis underlying 
much empirical work. Many economists are sceptical towards this idea, as it involves money 
illusion, and thus runs counter to the standard rationality arguments. However, there is now 
considerable survey evidence by Bewley (1999) and Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997), 
among others, documenting that money illusion does exist. Fehr and Tyran (2001) report  
experimental evidence that money illusion may have important effects. Akerlof, Dickens and 
Perry (1996) explore the consequences of DNWR within a simulation model, formalising the 
ideas of Tobin (1972).  
As to the legal restrictions argument, MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) point out that under 
European legal rules, wage contracts for individual workers can only be changed by mutual 
consent. (This is in contrast to US law, where workers are assumed to consent to a wage cut if 
they show up at work, see Malcomson, 1997.) Holden (1994) makes the same observation for 
collective agreements.
3
 MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and Holden (1999) show that this 
feature - fixed nominal wage contracts that can only be changed by mutual consent - may be 
crucial to prevent hold-up inefficiency, and thus induce efficient levels of investment. Larsen 
(undated) shows how fixed wage contracts are consistent with an efficiently operating   
economy in a dynamic general equilibrium model. 
2 Efficiency wage theories and insider-outsider theories are also sometimes mentioned as explanations of DNWR, 
but these theories explain real wage rigidity and need additional assumptions to generate DNWR. 
3 The legal position of collective agreements varies between countries, and between various types of agreements 
within countries, but this falls outside the scope of this paper. 5
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Figure 1. The standard model. Equilibrium employment is given by the inter- 
section of the wage and price curves.
Akerlof et al. (1996) and Holden (1994, 2004) use the same macroeconomic framework to 
analyse the implications of DNWR (see Andersen, 2001, for a textbook-like version of Aker-
lof et al.’s model, and Palley, 1994, for a related argument). Let me therefore use some space 
to describe this. Consider a standard monopolistic competition economy, with a large number 
of symmetric firms, each producing a different good. Production takes place under constant 
returns to scale, with labour as the only input. Firms face downward-sloping demand curves 
(with uniform elasticity), and set prices so as to maximise profits. As is well known, this im-
plies that prices are set as a constant mark-up over wages, implying that the real wage is a 
constant, independent of the aggregate employment rate.  (See the horizontal price curve in 
figure 1.) Wages are set at firm level, in a bargain between workers and firms. The outcome 
of the bargaining is affected by the aggregate employment rate, as a higher employment rate 
improves the bargaining position of the workers. Thus the wage curve, representing the out-
come of the wage setting, is upward-sloping in the employment – real-wage space, see figure 1. 
Without any nominal wage rigidity, figure 1 illustrates the standard result that the equilib-
rium rate of employment (and also the equilibrium rate of unemployment) is given by the in-
tersection of the wage and price curve, and thus is independent of the rate of inflation. The 
model is then essentially that of Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) (see page 19), or 
Blanchard (2003, page 132), where the same figure is depicted. In this model, any change that 6
weakens the bargaining position of the workers (e.g. a reduction of unemployment benefits) 
moves the wage curve downwards, raising equilibrium employment. 
In Akerlof et al. (1996), a simulation model is explored where firm-specific shocks induce 
changes in what they refer to as the notional real wage, i.e. the real wage that would prevail 
without any nominal wage rigidity. If a negative shock takes place so that the notional real 
wage involves a nominal wage cut, Akerlof et al. assume that DNWR (due to fairness rea-
sons) prevents the cut, implying that real wages are higher than they would otherwise have 
been. Under low or negative inflation, this will happen in a large part of the economy, so that 
wage pressure increases, the wage curve moves up in figure 1, and the equilibrium rate of 
employment is reduced. 
In Holden (1994, 2004), DNWR is justified by the legal feature mentioned above. Consis-
tent with institutional regularities in many countries, it is assumed that when collective 
agreements are up for renewal (usually annually), they will be prolonged in nominal terms 
unless both parties agree to a change. Holden shows that the party that must initiate the 
change has a strategic disadvantage in the bargaining process. Under positive inflation, workers 
want a nominal wage rise, so that they have a strategic disadvantage. Thus, wage pressure is 
reduced, the wage curve moves downwards, and equilibrium employment increases. Under 
negative inflation, or under low inflation in firms experiencing a negative shock so that wages 
should be cut, it is the firm who wants to reduce wages, and thus have the strategic disadvan-
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Figure 2. Inflation weakens the bargaining position of the workers,  
lowering the wage curve and increasing equilibrium employment.7
tage. In this case, wage pressure is increased, the wage curve moves up, and equilibrium em-
ployment is decreased (see figure 2). The upshot is a Phillips curve which is vertical for high  
inflation and negative inflation, but high inflation involves lower unemployment than nega-
tive inflation, cf. figure 3. (The smoothing reflects firm-specific shocks.) 
Why is the party who wants to initiate the change at a strategic disadvantage? Holden 
analyses this in a non-cooperative bargaining model of the Rubinstein (1982) type. Both par-
ties may disrupt production (strike or lock-out) as a means of enforcing a renegotiation of the 
wage contract. If a strike or lockout takes place, the outcome will be a real wage which de-
pends on the bargaining position of the parties, including the effect of the aggregate employ-
ment rate. However, initiating a strike or lockout also involves costs to both parties, in the 
form of lost output during the work stoppage, and possibly also due to adverse effects on 
reputation, increased uncertainty etc 
To fix ideas, consider the following simple numerical illustration. (See Holden, 1994, 2004, 
for a rigorous treatment.) Assume for simplicity a stationary economic environment, where 
wage negotiations undertaken during a work stoppage (strike or lock-out) lead to a real wage 
of 100. Consider first an inflation scenario, where inflation has eroded the real value of the 
nominal wage specified in the contract. Thus, we assume that the real value of the existing 
contract wage is 90. Now the contract is up for possible renegotiation. If a strike takes place, 
there will be an agreement on a new wage of 100. Furthermore, a strike (or lock-out) will in-
volve costs corresponding to a per time unit loss of 5 over the contract period, for both workers 
and firms. Thus, if the workers initiate a strike, they will obtain a payoff of 100 – 5 = 95. 
Inflation 
Unemployment    U
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Figure 3. The long run Phillip curve. Zero or negative inflation in-
volves higher unemployment on permanent basis 8
Clearly, strike threats are credible, as this will give the workers a higher payoff than they will 
obtain from prolonging the existing contract. However, if the firm offers a new contract of 95 
+ İ, where İ is a small positive number, strike threats will no longer be credible. Workers will 
obtain a higher payoff from accepting the firm’s offer of 95 + İ than from initiating a strike. 
Thus, the workers will accept the offer, and no strike will take place. 
Then consider a negative inflation scenario, where the real value of the existing nominal 
contract wage has increased to, say, 110. In this case, it is the firm who wants to reduce 
wages. A lockout is credible, as it provides the firm with a payoff corresponding to a wage of 
105 (wage 100 + costs 5 = 105), which is better than the existing wage of 110. But if the 
workers offer a wage of 105 – İ, a lockout is no longer credible, as it yields a lower payoff to 
the firm than the workers’ new wage offer. Thus, the firm will accept the offer of 105 – İ, and 
no lockout will take place. 
The example above shows that even if the real situation is the same in the two scenarios – 
absent an initial wage, the new contract should give a real wage of 100 – the existence of the 
initial nominal contract wage affects the bargaining outcome. High inflation erodes the real 
value of the nominal wage given in the contract, putting workers at a strategic disadvantage. 
Negative inflation, or low inflation and a firm-specific negative shock, puts firms at a strate-
gic disadvantage. 
Consider the effect of indexation in this example. Under low but positive inflation, partial 
indexation to the general price level will raise the nominal wage that is specified in the con-
tract. Thus, it will raise the nominal wage at which DNWR prevails, implying that DNWR 
may be binding when relative wages change under higher rates of inflation than what would 
be the case if there were no indexation. On the other hand, under negative inflation, symmet-
ric, partial, indexation that entails a reduction in nominal wages will work in the opposite 
way, reducing the nominal wage specified in the contract. However, under negative inflation, 
DNWR seems likely to be binding in parts of the labour market anyway. 
Holden (2004) extends the analysis in the 1994 paper by also allowing for an unorganised 
sector. Here, DNWR hinges on the strength of the employment protection legislation, which 
provides workers with a means of refusing a wage cut proposed by the employer. Thus, this 
analysis suggests that DNWR is prevalent in countries with a high coverage of collective 
agreements/high union density (as unions have a stronger position to refuse nominal wage 
cuts than individual workers have) and in countries with strong employment protection legis-
lation.  9
Some counter-arguments 
The macroeconomic effects of DNWR implied by the models above are not undisputed cf. 
Hogan (1997) and Yates (1998). Most importantly, Hogan (1997) argues that if wage setting 
is forward-looking, firms will take the possible future effect of DNWR into consideration. 
Elsby (2004) takes the argument further within a fully specified forward-looking model of 
wage setting under DNWR arising from fairness considerations. Elsby argues that the risk of 
future DNWR may lead to attenuation of wage increases, i.e. that firms raise wages less than 
they would have done if wages were fully flexible. The attenuation of wage increases will be 
stronger under low inflation. The idea here is that, under high inflation, firms facing a positive 
demand or technology shock will raise wages considerably, as they know that the high real 
wage can be reversed in the future by just letting nominal wages be constant. Under low infla-
tion and DNWR, firms facing a positive shock will be more reluctant to raise wages a lot, as 
raising wages increase the risk that DNWR will push up wages in the future. (Bewley, in his 
discussion of Akerlof et al., 2000, reports conversations with managers who express exactly 
this concern.) Elsby then shows that previous studies, by neglecting this effect, have over-
stated the costs of DNWR. 
Note, however, that this argument is not fatal for the effect of inflation on the workers’ 
bargaining position. The feature that rational agents take into consideration the possibility that 
DNWR may affect wages in the future, will diminish the negative effect of inflation on the 
union’s bargaining position, but it will not remove it (Holden, 1997).  
A second counter-argument by Hogan (1997) against the effect of DNWR on employment 
is that higher real wages need not lead to lower employment if firms hoard labour, or if higher 
real wages make an unemployed person more likely to accept a job. It is, however, not clear 
that this point is valid. If wage pressure is increased, wage and price setting are not consistent, 
and something has to change so as to make wage and price setting consistent. If firms hoard 
labour, so that unemployment does not increase, the real wage implied by the wage setting 
would remain higher than the real wage implied by the price setting. Thus, it seems that ex-
cessive wage pressure would prevail until firms started to shed labour, raising unemployment. 
A more general argument against the idea that nominal wages affect output is based on evi-
dence that real wages seem to be acyclical or slightly pro-cyclical. The argument runs as fol-
lows: If nominal wages are rigid, and the labour demand curve is downward sloping, demand 
shocks will involve movement along the labour demand curve and thus involve counter-cyclical 
real wages. But evidence suggests that real wages are acyclical or slightly pro-cyclical. This has 
been raised as a key objection to macroeconomic models with nominal wage rigidity. However, 
as Spencer (1998) pointed out, if there are both demand shocks and technology shocks, the latter 
will induce procyclical behaviour of real wages. The overall cyclicality of real wages will de-10
pend on both types of shocks. Spencer shows that US postwar data indicates that a positive de-
mand disturbance is associated with a temporary decline in real wages, consistent with a model 
with nominal wage rigidity. 
An interesting approach to the effect of inflation on wage setting is the Grease and Sand 
argument of Groshen and Schweitzer (2000). They note the well-known effect that, under 
downward nominal wage rigidity, inflation may facilitate changes in wage distribution across 
occupations (Grease). On the other hand, they also argue that inflation involves greater expec-
tational errors that may cause unintended changes in the wage distribution across firms 
(Sand). These effects are analysed in a unified framework, making it possible to evaluate 
benefits and costs of inflation in the labour market.  
3  The effect of inflation on staggered nominal wage contracts 
In the literature on staggered wage and price setting, it is usually implicitly or explicitly as-
sumed that one can abstract from trend inflation without any problems.  However, as shown 
by Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988), this is not so. Under high inflation, wage adjustment will 
be more frequent, and this will cause the short-run Phillips curve to be steeper, reducing the 
persistence of shocks. In related models, Helpman and Leiderman (1990) and Kolsrud and 
Nymoen (1998) argue that inflation reconciles the conflicting claims of workers and firms, 
and thus may affect the equilibrium output. More recently, Ascari (2000) has shown that in-
flation increases the forward-lookingness of wage setters, again reducing the persistence of 
shocks to the economy.  
Allowing for steady-state inflation in standard staggered-contracts models has several and 
opposing effects on long-run output and employment. Ascari (2003) shows that under time-
contingent price setting, trend inflation implies that otherwise symmetric firms will set differ-
ent prices in steady state. Due to the usual non-linearities in the utility and production func-
tions, this leads to an aggregate output loss. Ascari concludes that “a very mild level of trend 
inflation implies huge and unrealistic changes in the steady-state output level.” In contrast, 
Karanassou, Sala and Snower (2003a,b) argue that the reduction in inflation over the last de-
cades plays an important role in explaining increased unemployment. Karanassou et al. refer 
to their idea as “frictional growth”, and the key point is as follows. Under staggered, time-
contingent nominal contracts, nominal variables are a weighted average of their past and  
expected future variables. Owing to time discounting, wage setters will put less weight on the 
last part of the contract period, implying that inflation causes wages and prices to lag behind 
money growth. Consequently, the higher the rate of inflation, the more wages and prices lag 
behind money, thus increasing the real money stock, which again increases output and   11
employment. Furthermore, Karanassou et al. argue that the weighting is amplified owing to 
uncertainty and multiple nominal rigidities, i.e. both rigid wages and rigid prices.  
4  Incomplete labour contracts and nominal wage growth 
Almost all the literature on DNWR deals with the idea that nominal wages are constant in 
situations where flexible wages would fall. However, there is a small body of literature that 
argues that there are mechanisms inducing a certain nominal wage growth, implying that 
unless inflation is sufficiently high to allow for this nominal wage growth, other mechanisms 
(read unemployment) must be at work to prevent the nominal wage growth.  
A key possible cause of nominal wage growth is incomplete labour contracts. As argued by 
Moene (1988), workers can impose costs on a firm even when working under the existing 
contract, e.g. by strictly adhering to the working rules (work-to-rule). Such behaviour is well 
known from real-world wage negotiations in many industrialised economies. On the other 
hand, the firm may reduce flexible types of remuneration as bonus payments etc. Yet if   
workers can impose larger costs on the firms than vice versa, which appears to be a plausible 
assumption in most cases, nominal wages increase during work-to-rule (Holden, 1997). Intui-
tively, firms are willing to raise the nominal wages so as to avoid a costly period of work-to-
rule; see Holden (1989) for supporting empirical evidence. Nickell and Quintini (2003) find 
evidence for the UK that there are employees “who would have had negative nominal wage 
changes without the distortion who, in fact, have significantly positive, rather than zero, 
nominal wage changes”, i.e. as predicted by the idea that work-to-rule may induce nominal 
wage growth, inducing higher real wages, even in a situation where real wages would have 
gone down had inflation been higher. 
5  Multi-level bargaining and the co-ordination of wage setting 
Most of the literature on DNWR presumes that wage setting is unco-ordinated. Allowing for 
centralised or co-ordinated wage setting implies additional effects. Most importantly, several 
Nordic researchers have argued that multi-level wage setting systems, as in the Nordic coun-
tries, where wages are negotiated both centrally (at national and/or industry level) and locally, 
may cause a minimum rate of growth in nominal wages. In the literature, two versions of this 
feature have been discussed.  
Rødseth (1985), Holden (1988), Rødseth and Holden (1990), and Calmfors (1993) argue 
that wage setters at the central level both generally want wage restraint, and, to a large extent, 
are able to predict wage growth at the local level. However, some wage growth at the local 12
level is unavoidable, in part due to the possibility of work-to-rule under the peace clause that 
prevails at the local negotiations, given that the central agreements are in force. Under low in-
flation, wage restraint may require a nominal wage cut at the central level, and in this situa-
tion DNWR at the central level may induce higher real wages and lower employment. Holden 
(1998) provides empirical evidence for the existence of a floor to nominal wage growth of 2 – 3 
percent at the central level in the manufacturing sectors of the four major Nordic countries for 
the period 1961 – 1985/92.  
The other version of the inflationary bias of multi-level wage setting, advocated by, among 
others, Hibbs and Locking (1996) and Iversen (1999), emphasises that central wage setting 
has historically involved compression of relative wages. This causes a need for wage growth 
at the local level to restore relative wages, wholly or partially, to their market values. Under 
low inflation, the combination of wage growth at both levels will induce excessive real wage 
growth and lower unemployment. 
Note that one can also argue for the opposite conclusion: that wage setting systems with a 
co-ordinated or centralised element are better suited to adapt to changes in the rate of infla-
tion. The idea here is that the centralised wage settlements often end up in a general increase 
which is a little below the sum of inflation and average productivity growth. Thus, if inflation 
is reduced, a coordinated, multi-level system may, in principle, easily adapt by reducing the 
general increase, without being bothered by coordination problems that may exist in less cen-
tralised wage-setting systems. One may argue that countries with extensive incomes policies 
and social pacts, like the Netherlands and Norway, have adapted better to the low inflation era 
than countries with less co-ordinated wage setting as France and Spain. 
6  Near-rational wage and price setters  
For decades, most economists have frowned upon explanations based on non-rational agents. 
While such behaviour is often viewed as plausible, many economists have argued that it is ad
hoc. Furthermore, one has wanted to avoid a situation where different researchers invoke dif-
ferent behavioural assumptions as key foundations in their own theories. However, research 
by cognitive psychologists and experimental economists has provided strong support for be-
havioural assumptions that differ systematically from the standard economic main assumption 
(see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, and the surveys in Rabin, 1998, and Fehr and Schmidt, 
2002). 
Building on this research, Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000) argue that wage and price set-
ters treat inflation differently from what most economists assume. First, when inflation is low, 
many people ignore it. Second, workers view nominal wage increases as a sign that they are 13
appreciated, without reflecting about nominal wage increases as being an element of a general 
rise in wage and price levels. 
More specifically, Akerlof et al. consider a model where workers’ effort depends on their 
wage relative to a reference level. Near-rational firms do not take low inflation into account 
when updating their reference level; thus, wages are increased by less than they should. Cor-
respondingly, rational firms who know that their workers are near-rational will also under-
weight inflation when updating the reference level. Thus, wage pressure is reduced, and equi-
librium employment increased, for positive but moderate inflation. 
When inflation is high, however, underweighting of inflation will involve much larger 
costs. Thus, near-rational wage and price setters will take inflation fully into account when it 
is high. Hence, the reduction in wage pressure induced by low inflation only prevails for 
moderate, positive levels of inflation, and not for high rates of inflation. 
7  Empirical evidence  
The last few years, a rapidly increasing literature has emerged testing for the existence and 
implications of DNWR. Due to the size and speed of increase of this literature, only a brief 
selective survey will be provided. Different types of evidence have been put forward. Akerlof 
et al (1996), Bewley (1999), Agell and Lundborg (2003) and Agell and Bennmarker (2003) 
report results from interviews and surveys where employers and employees are asked about 
(among other thing) DNWR. These studies report that nominal wage cuts are rare in the US 
and Sweden.  
Other studies investigate DNWR in large micro-data sets based on wage surveys, adminis-
trative files, personnel files, or data for union contracts. While these studies generally find 
nominal wage cuts to be more frequent than one finds in interviews, the studies with few ex-
ceptions nevertheless find evidence that DNWR exists. Broadly, one can distinguish two ap-
proaches. The skewness-location approach of McLaughlin (1994) focuses on the effect of in-
flation on the distribution of wage changes. Recent applications include Christofides and 
Leung (2003) for Canada, Ekberg (2002) for Sweden, Kimura and Ueda (1997) for Japan, 
Nickell and Quintini (2003) for the UK, and Lebow et al. (2003) for the US. (The latter two 
papers also discuss previous empirical findings for the UK and the US.) Typically, the studies 
find (i) a spike in the distribution of nominal wage changes at zero and (ii) that the rate of in-
flation affects the distribution of nominal wage changes, both features as would be implied by 
the existence of DNWR. The study by Lebow et al is also noteworthy because it includes data 
on total compensation. Lebow et al find that even if total compensation is somewhat more 
flexible than wage and salaries alone, there is a significant amount of rigidity for compensa-14
tion. Furthermore, firms do not seem to circumvent wage rigidity by changing other types of 
compensation. 
The other approach, referred to as the earnings function approach by Knoppik and 
Beissinger (2003), add other explanatory variables that are usually included in wage equa-
tions, see e.g. Altonji and Devereux (1999) for the US,  Fehr and Goette (2000) for Switzer-
land, Knoppik and Beissinger (2003) and Bauer, Bonin and Sunde (2003) for Germany, De-
vicienti, Maida and Sestito (2004) for Italy, and Barwell and Schweitzer (2004) for the UK. 
The latter three papers also distinguish between real and nominal wage rigidity, and find evi-
dence of both. An exception to the general picture of evidence of DNWR in recent studies is 
Biscourp, Dessy and Fourcade (2004), who in a micro-data set for France find evidence of 
flexible nominal wages. However, Biscourp, Dessy and Fourcade also find evidence for 
asymmetric adjustment of wages, where negative shocks have less impact than positive, 
which may be interpreted as a type of DNWR. 
Few studies attempt to discriminate between the fairness- and the contract-theories of 
DNWR, as the key implications are shared by both hypotheses. One possible way to circum-
vent this problem is to compare differences between countries. Based on the cross-country 
differences of ten EU countries, Dessy (2002) finds evidence that DNWR is more prevalent in 
countries with intermediate levels of bargaining than in countries with centralized or decen-
tralized wage setting, while high bargaining coverage seems to reduce DNWR. Holden and 
Wulfsberg (2004) use industry panel data from Eurostat, covering 12 countries over the period 
1973-99, and find evidence that strict employment protection legislation and high union den-
sity increase DNWR, while the effect of bargaining coverage is positive but insignificant. 
These latter results support the contract theory of Holden (2004). On the other hand, the fact 
that downward nominal rigidity is also found in countries with weak legal protection of   
workers' nominal wages, as in the US and Switzerland, suggests that fairness considerations 
are also of importance.  
Another way to discriminate between theories is to derive testable implications that differ. 
Elsby (2004) suggests a test based on the idea that the effect of inflation on DNWR differs be-
tween the fairness and the contract justifications. As explained in section 2 above, the risk of 
future DNWR will lead forward-looking firms to attenuate wage increases. Elsby argues that 
if DNWR is caused by fairness concerns, the attenuation will be weaker under low inflation 
(as DNWR is less likely to be binding in the future), but inflation will not affect attenuation 
caused by contract effects. Elsby finds evidence for the UK that attenuation of wage increases 
is stronger under low inflation, supporting the fairness hypothesis. Holden (2002) also sug-
gests a test for discriminating between these two theories, but this test has not yet been im-
plemented.  15
While most studies use recent data, there is also evidence for the existence of DNWR in 
earlier time periods. Among others, Hines (2000) shows that nominal wages were rigid in the 
downturns in the US in 1893, 1929 and 1981. Fregert (2000) provides evidence of downward 
nominal wage rigidity in Sweden during the Great Depression. 
Evidence of a long-run inflation - unemployment – trade-off 
According to the standard view, there is no long-run trade-off between inflation and unem-
ployment. Yet there are now a number of studies that report evidence in support of such a 
trade-off. Some illustrative examples are these: Bullard and Keating (1995) studying the long-
run relationship between inflation and output in 58 countries over the period 1960-90. They 
find a positive and significant long-run response of the level of real output to a permanent in-
flation shock for the four European countries with the lowest rates of inflation. Karanassou et 
al. (2003a) find a long-run Phillips curve trade-off for a panel of EU countries for the period 
1977 – 1998. Akerlof et al. (1996) and Karanassou et al. (2003b) find a long-run Phillips 
curve trade-off in the US. Ahmed and Rogers (2000) also find that the long-run effects of in-
flation on output in the US are positive. Lundborg and Sacklén (2001) finds evidence of a 
long-run Phillips curve trade-off in Sweden for the period 1963-2000, indicating that a reduc-
tion in inflation from 2 ½ per cent to zero is associated with an increase in unemployment of 
more than two percentage points. Correspondingly, Fortin and Dumont (2000) find evidence 
on Canadian aggregate data suggesting that an increase in inflation from 1 ½ percent to 2 ½ 
percent would reduce unemployment by 1 ½ percentage points.  
These findings are consistent with other studies reporting persistent negative output effects 
of too strict monetary policy. Ball (1999) presents evidence supporting the view that a too 
strict monetary policy in the 1980s and 1990s in some European countries has led to a long-
lasting increase in unemployment. Bernanke and Carey (1996) document that countries that 
stuck longer to the Gold standard in the 1930s, involving years with falling prices, experienced 
higher real wages and lower output than the countries that left the Gold standard. 
So far it would, nevertheless, be fair to say that the evidence of a long-run inflation – un-
employment trade-off is disputed. Among other things, several of the studies are based on 
rather restrictive assumptions; see, for example, the discussion of Akerlof et al. (1996) by 
Gordon (1996) and Mankiw (1996), as well as Canmba-Mendez, Carcia and Palenzuela 
(2003). 16
8  Will society adapt? 
Many economist are sceptical towards the idea that low inflation will entail important and 
persistent effects on output and employment, based on the argument that any downward rigid-
ity that may exist is the result of an inflationary environment, and that society will adapt to a 
zero inflation policy without a large and persistent impact on output and employment (see, for 
example, Gordon, 1996, Hogan, 1997, Yates, 1998). Such changes may affect the institutional 
setting, e.g. the type of labour contracts, or people’s view of what is fair behaviour. 
It seems reasonable to expect that the costs associated with higher unemployment under 
very low inflation will induce changes in the way labour markets operate. One would expect 
pay systems to become more flexible, for example by a more extensive use of bonus systems, 
although the evidence in Lebow et al (2003) referred to above may indicate that this will have 
limited effect. 
Holden (2001) explores a model where firms choose between fixed wage contracts (where 
the employer cannot lay off the worker, and the wage can only be changed by mutual con-
sent), or contracts where employment is at will, so that either party may terminate employ-
ment. It is shown that a fixed wage contract provides better incentives for investment and 
training, while employment at will facilitates efficient mobility. High inflation makes fixed 
wage contracts more attractive as seen from the firm, because it erodes the real value of a 
fixed contract wage over time, so that badly matched workers are more likely to quit for other 
jobs. Thus, disinflation has opposing effects on labour market rigidity: fixed wage contracts 
become more rigid in real terms, but fewer firms will choose fixed wage contracts.  
An alternative interpretation of Holden’s (2001) model is that fixed wage contracts corre-
spond to jobs in countries with strong employment protection legislation, where labour mar-
ket laws and regulations constitute important barriers to firms’ possibility of unilaterally cut-
ting nominal wages. Employment at will resembles jobs in countries with weak employment 
legislation, like the UK and the US, or it can be thought of as temporary jobs. Under this in-
terpretation, a reduction in the rate of inflation will exacerbate the real wage rigidity imposed 
by employment protection legislation. On the other hand, firms are likely to try to opt out of 
the rigidity by choosing more temporary labour contracts, consistent with evidence of in-
creased use of temporary labour contracts in Sweden in the low-inflation period in the 1990s  
(Agell and Lundborg, 2003). In addition, the political pressure towards a weakening of the 
employment protection legislation is likely to increase.  
Regarding the effect of fairness, Gordon (1996) argues that in a low-inflation economy, 
nominal wage cuts will become more common, and there will be less reason to view them as 
unfair. Against this view one can argue that the fairness and legal explanations for DNWR 
may be complementary, and that they may strengthen each other in the sense that the exis-17
tence of both makes either more persistent: The fact that many labour market participants find 
nominal wage cuts unfair may also contribute to the continued existence of the legal protec-
tion of nominal wages. The legal protection of nominal wages makes wage cuts rare even in a 
low-inflation environment, thus preventing Gordon’s (1996) argument that the fairness con-
siderations will be undermined by wage cuts being “too common”. 
Empirical evidence also indicates that one should not be too optimistic that labour markets 
and wage-setting institutions will adapt rapidly to low inflation. The extensive downward 
nominal wage rigidity in Sweden and Switzerland documented by Agell and Lundborg (2003) 
and Fehr and Goette (2000), even after years of close to zero inflation and high unemploy-
ment, also shows that rigidities may be highly persistent. Fehr and Goette also find that the 
wage “sweep-up” caused by nominal rigidity is strongly correlated with unemployment, sug-
gesting that downward rigidity of nominal wages does contribute to higher unemployment. 
9 Concluding  remarks   
Let me briefly summarise the main conclusions, as seen from a policy-oriented perspective. 
Both the theoretical arguments and the empirical evidence indicate that wage pressure is in-
creased under low inflation. To keep wage growth down, and to ensure consistency between 
the wage and price setting, higher unemployment is probably required if one aims at very low 
inflation. Over time, labour markets and wage setting institutions will probably adapt partially 
to low inflation, by increased use of flexible remuneration and temporary wage contracts. 
However, it is difficult to predict how far-reaching these changes will be.  
In macro and monetary economics, wage and price rigidities are often the key source of in-
efficiencies. However, as observed above, wage and price rigidities may also play useful 
roles, as sharing risk or protecting against opportunistic behaviour. In particular, the legal rule 
that contract renegotiations require mutual consent plays an important role in ensuring effi-
cient investments. Thus, if lower inflation leads to wages being more flexible, this would in-
volve costs as well as benefits. Furthermore, without restrictions on the employer’s right to 
unilaterally cut nominal wages, employment protection legislation is unlikely to be effective. 
Thus, proposals for changes in labour laws are likely to be met with strong resistance from 
unions and insiders. Evidence also suggests that the notion that nominal wage cuts are unfair 
is persistent. Thus it seems likely that adaptation will not be complete, so that, even in the 
very long run, a very low inflation target will imply permanently higher unemployment. 
From a policy point of view, a key question is clearly at which rate of inflation wage pres-
sure increases to the extent that it involves non-negligible costs. Lundborg and Sacklén (2001) 
find evidence for Sweden that a reduction in long-run inflation from 2 ½ to zero per cent 
would be associated with an increase in unemployment of more than two percentage points. 18
In contrast, Nickell and Quintini (2003) find evidence for the UK that an increase in long-run 
inflation from 2 ½ to 5 ½ per cent would cause equilibrium unemployment to fall by only 
0.13 percentage points. However, there is obviously a lot of uncertainty involved with these 
estimates, and there is also likely be considerable variation across countries with different la-
bour market institutions. One should also remember that if low inflation is associated with 
high productivity growth, lower price margins or low import price growth, there will be more 
room for nominal wage growth, and thus fewer problems with increased wage pressure. 
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